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ADMINISTRATIVE OPTIONS 
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California lnsr ir urc of Technology 
As a mathematical economist, I work at the 
foundations level of risk/benefit analysis, group 
decision processes, polling, and related areas. The 
foundations, however, are frequently removed from 
real applications. . . 
My situation among all of you practitiOners re-
minds me of a joke about an engineer and a mathe-
matician stranded on an island. The only food source 
on the island was a coconut tree with coconuts high 
at the top. A coin was flipped to see who would re-
trieve the first meal. The engineer lost. He climbed 
up the tree, which was a difficult task indeed, and 
leaning far out on a branch that was little more sup-
port than a leaf, he grabbed a coconut and returned 
with it. Within a few days it was the mathematician's 
turn to get the food. Up the tree he went, following 
exactly the same path as the engineer. He managed to 
reach a coconut much higher than the first. With the 
coconut in hand he returned to the branch originally 
used for support by the engineer. He leaned out with 
the branch quivering under this weight and carefully 
placed his coconut exactly where the coconut re-
trieved by the engineer had been. He then slid back 
down the tree with no fruit. The engineer looked at 
him dumbfoundedly and asked, "Why on earth did 
you do that?" The tone of the mathematician's reply 
was·as though he had only done what was expected of 
him: "I reduced it to a problem that has already been 
solved." 
My goal here is like the mathematician's. I want to 
show you a few very simple examples of the problems 
that many theorists think are keys to understanding 
the difficult practical problems you face. These are, 
simply stated, unsolved problems to which many of 
our more complicated problems can be reduced. 
They seem to be symptomatic of the problems that 
we run into when theorizing about cost/benefit 
analysis and when theorizing about societal decisions 
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in general. 
The overriding purpose of this conference is to un-
cover guidelines for social decisionmakers. Everyone 
seems to agree or at least the thrust of the conversa-
tions at the co~ference has been, that the guidelines 
should include the people who are going to be 
affected by your decisions. Except in the most nar-
row philosophies this means that-indeed, the politi-
cal process requires that-you have got to find out 
what the people want. This question is translated al-
most unconsciously into a problem of determining 
the "social preference" among the alternative 
courses of action that you face. A lawyer might use 
the term "public interest" and tell you to follow it. 
Presumably all this, regardless of the terminology, 
has something to do with what people think is good 
for themselves, and you are charged with the 
responsibility of giving it proper "weight" in your 
decisions. 
It ts here that the interesting and difficult problems 
start. Somehow you must take account of how in-
dividuals feel, and then, using some tool or another, 
you must make a general statement, find a summary 
statistic so to speak, about how the group feels. 
There are two types of approaches to the solution of 
this problem. One is represented by cost/benefit or 
its reincarnation, risk/benefit analysis. I shall refer 
to approaches in this class as attitudt:: aggregation 
models. The other approach is much more political 
and is represented by public hearings, testimony, 
committee decisions, etc. This second approach I 
shall refer to as public participation models. Both 
have some disturbing aspects. 
ATTITUDE AGGREGATION 
The basic theory of attitude aggregation as found 
in cost/benefit or risk/benefit is simple. The essen-
tials are captured by equation 1, but what the 
symbols mean requires much discussion. 
(1) l Yi(X) 2._ L Vi (y) implies x is "better" than y. 
i£ s i£ s 
Suppose you are comparing two projects or possi-
ble actions, x and y. Suppose further that S is the set 
of all individuals whose opinions are to be con-
sidered. Cost/benefit and risk/benefit analysis either 
explicitly or implicitly will have you find the values 
that individuals place on x and find the values that in-
dividuals place on y. These values are represented by 
the numbers Vi(x) and Vi(y). The numbers are 
summed over all individuals. If the sum of values 
they place on x is greater than the sum of values they 
place on y, then you are directed to take action x. 
The basic theory represented by (1) seems suffi-
ciently simple to be above questioning, but there are 
two serious problems. The first problem is how to get 
the individuals' values; How are these to be meas-
ured? Polling provides an obvious possibility, but 
just how reliable is it? What could possibly be wrong 
with simply asking people what they want? The con-
cept of a loaded question comes immediately to 
mind. If you are in favor of urban renewal, you ask 
people, "Are you in favor of eliminating urba~ 
blight?" How could anyone be against that? Or 1f 
you are in favor of urban renewal, make sure that 
· those conducting the interviews also favor urban re-
newal. Subtle things, like repeating questions or smil-
ing at the proper time, can be effective. The individu-
al answering the questions sees no immediate conse-
quences from his answers, so a pleasant conversation 
with the interviewer could be a sufficient reward to 
bias the answers given. These things, as it turns out, 
are very effective in polling techniques and suggest 
strongly that polls should be used with caution at 
best. 
The problem of determining individual values for 
use in equation (l) is much deeper. What happens 
when you really try to measure the strength of 
peoples' convictions and attitudes so that the 
measures can be added-such as (l) suggests? What 
must be measured? There are many names for it such 
as utility, benefits, attitude intensities, etc. From a 
formal point of view, at the individual level, they are 
all the same thing and have the same measurement 
problems. There must be some type of ~rigin a?d 
unit of measurement. For example, how high a chff 
would I jump off to see one president versus a~oth­
er? You can measure my intensity between presiden-
tial candidates that way and, in fact, this is the type 
of unit chosen in risk/benefit analysis. How many 
times would I run around the block to see one candi-
date over another? This is another measurement even 
though I am unaware of its having been incorporated 
into any formal methodology. How much would .1 
pay to see one candidate over another? C~early, t~Is 
is the measurement structure of cost/benefit analysis. 
Now, all of these measurements, when put to a 
single individual, have a type of internal consistency. 
They are definitely related to one another in a 
systematic way. It is rather remarkable, but it can be 
demonstrated. But when you put these measurements 
in a sum like (1) across individuals, the answer is sen-
sitive to the measurement used. It is possible to 
measure the amount that people would pay and 
determine that xis better than y. Then with individ-
ual attitudes unchanged, measure those attitudes in 
terms of some risk dimension and get the opposite 
result-thaty is better than x. 
What is the point? While the individual scales are 
not sensitive to the unit of measurement in the sense 
that certain ordering properties are independent of 
the measurement system, the additive scales are 
sensitive to it. This is a problem about which users 
should be aware. The full ramifications and what to 
do about it remain as part of the currently unknown. 
Recall, in my introduction, I admitted that I am a 
basic resea.rcher and my focus is upon key problems 
and not necessarily solutions. 
The next problem which hides behind equation (l) 
is a rather paradoxical aspect of individual atti-
tudes-the fundamental thing that must be meas-
ured. Suppose you are asked your preference be-
tween the two lotteries represented as lottery A and 
lott~ry B on Figure 1. 
A B 
Figure 1. Method of measuring preferences. 
If you prefer lottery A, a random dart i~ going .to 
be thrown which will hit within the Circle With 
probability 1. If it hits the line, you get. zero, but if it 
hits anywhere else, you get $4.00. That IS lottery A. If 
you choose lottery B, a random dar~ ~ill be t~ro~n 
hitting inside the circle with probability 1. If It ?1~s 
anywhere in the pie-shaped area, you get $16, but If It 
hits anywhere else, you get zero .. 
When people are faced with the option of playing 
either of these lotteries once, some will choose B 
while others who are more risk averse will choose A. 
These represent legitimate differences of opinions 
and the method of elicitation (observing choice be-
havior) represents a legitimate method of measuring 
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preferences. 
Here is where the paradox occurs. When a differ-
ent measuring system is used, those who indicated a 
preference for A end up placing a higher value on 
B-a complete switch. 
It works like this. Having indicated their pref-
erences between the two lotteries, individuals are 
then asked the maximum price they would pay for 
each (occasionally they are asked the minimum price 
you would take for each rather than play the lottery 
themselves). In this way, the dollar value of each 
lottery to the individual is measured. Theoretically, 
the lottery with the highest personal dollar value is 
the one most preferred. But that is not what is ob-
served. People who prefer A tend to place a higher 
value on B. So here is the problem. If you measure 
attitudes in terms of preference, you find their 
attitude going one way, but if you measure their 
attitudes in terms of dollars, how much they would 
take, how much they would pay, etc., you find the 
absolute opposite result. 
This is not a little statistical game. The experiment 
has been replicated many, many times. 1 It has been 
done for many dollars. Mathematical statisticians, 
economists, etc., have been used as subjects. Not 
only is it a phenomenon we really do not understand, 
it is also inconsistent with all known theories of de-
cision. It involves an immediate intransitivity. For 
the theories represented by (1 ), it means we face a 
very perpl~xing problem; namely, for two options (x, 
y), one can get, at the individual level of analysis, 
either V;(x) > V;(y) or V;(x) < V;(y), absolutely incon-
sistent measurements, depending upon such a subtle 
and innocent-looking aspect of the measurement 
system. 
The second class .of problems associated with {1) 
are independent of those discussed above. Suppose 
satisfactory measurements at the individual level of 
analysis have been obtained. What should be done 
with them? Equation (1) says to simply add them up. 
But, why should the numbers be added as opposed to 
being combined in some other mathematical way? 
T~is is a natural and important question, since 
d~fferent ways of combining the numbers imply 
different ways of resolving the implicit conflicts 
among citizens' preferences. 
~he .second class of problems stems from attempts 
to JUstify any method of conflict resolution implicit 
in fo~mulas such as (1). The best way to see the prob-
lems ~s to exa~ine some explicit methods of resolving 
conflicts which are not masked by complicated 
measurement systems. They are very interesting 
phenomena. 
Consider an example with three people and three 
op~ions, x, y, z. Mr. 1 likes x first, then y, then z. Mr. 
2 hkes Y first, then z, then x. Mr. 3 likes z first, then 
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x, then y. These ran kings are represented below. 
Mr. 1 Mr. 2 Mr. 3 
X y Z 
y Z X 
Z X y 
You are in charge of the agency which is to make a 
decision for this society of three people. What is it 
that the society wants? How do you choose, if you 
want to do what the people want? 
If you put x against y first, x wins by virtue of the 
preferences of 1 and 3. Put x against z, then z gets the 
majority vote from Mr. 2 and Mr. 3. You may be 
tempted to say that the outcome is z. 
However, if you put z against x first, you find z 
gets the vote, and when z then comes against y, it 
loses due to the preference of 1 and 2. So the winner 
is y. 
Now put z against y, the winner is y. Continuing to 
place y against x we find the winner is x. The out-
come depends entirely upon the sequence of contests. 
Those of you who have not seen this might say, 
"Well, the good professor is pulling one out of his 
hat. What is the likelihood that such a cycle will 
occur?" The news is bad. If preferences occur at 
random, the limiting probability of the cycle is one, 
as the number of people and options grow. It goes to 
probability one very rapidly. 
The cycle is the case. It is not the exception. All of 
our theories must take account of it. All methods of 
preference aggregation utilize some principle for 
resolving this difficulty one way or another, even 
though the method of resolution is often buried 
under a layer of concepts and factual materials. 
With the problem so simply stated, how should it 
be resolved? "Well," you might argue, "if you have 
a cycle, then the group is indifferent." That is a good 
idea, but the argument causes problems. First, it 
means that with "large" problems, groups will al-
most always be indifferent due to the likelihood of a 
cycle. It also has another problem. Suppose we are 
given a group with preferences over options (x, y, z, 
w) as listed above. 
Mr. 1 Mr. 2 Mr. 3 
Y X W 
X 
w 
w 
z 
z 
y 
Z y X 
A brief check will demonstrate a cycle from w to x 
to Y, to z to w. Thus, according to the suggestion 
above, the group is indifferent among all four 
options. The problem with this suggestion is that 
e~eryo~e prefers w to z. Not only does this example 
discredit the suggestion, it also demonstrates that 
majority rule can begin with a status quo (assume w) 
and end with an option everyone thinks is worse (z). 
Before drawing any conclusions, another example 
should be considered. This is a process which is fre-
quently used-I am sure you all have used it-called 
the Borda count. 
The example involves four candidate options w, x, 
y, and z and seven people. Their preferences are 
given below. 
Mr. 1 Mr. 2 Mr. 3 Mr. 4 Mr. 5 Mr. 6 Mr. 7 
W X y W X y W 
X y Z X y Z X 
y z w y z w y 
Z W X Z W X Z 
Total Points 
w 18 15-
x 19 14 
y 20- 13 
z 13 
For each individual the top ranked option gets four 
points, the next option gets three points, the third 
gets two points, and the bottom option gets one 
point. These points are then summed and the candi-
date with the greatest total number of points wins. 
When this is done, the winner is y with 20 points. 
Then comes x and w with z trailing with only 13 
points. 
Suppose z is dropped before the balloting. After 
all, everyone prefers y to z. If it is eliminated, three 
options are left. That means each individual's top 
option gets three points, the next one gets two and 
the lowest gets one point. If the group's preference is 
now computed, an amazing result· can be demon-
strated. The social preference has been inverted with 
w getting 15 points, x 14, andy last with 13. By re-
moving the loser, the social preference can be in-
verted, even though no individual's preference 
changed-all individuals' preferences remained con-
stant. 
By now the reader should be a little surprised and 
should be wondering about the implications. Two 
things are being suggested here. The first is that 
group attitudes and group choices do not follow the 
same laws as individual choices do. The second is 
going to be a statement about the sensitivity of group 
choice to decisionmaking procedures. This second 
implication will be explored after more examples. 
The first thing suggested by the examples is that 
group choices do not have the same type of internal 
consistency or optimization character that individual 
preferences do. Examples such as these inspired re-
searchers to investigate all conceivable ways to pass 
from a set of individual preferences to a social prefer-
ence. The problem has been elegantly axiomatized,2 
but the results have neither been what people ex-
pected nor wanted. The principal results are im-
possibility theorems which say that there is 'no "nice" 
way to solve the problem. 
Much theory and philosophy evolving from these 
efforts suggests that the concept of group preference. 
itself is not a good concept. It seems to involve the 
classic fallacy of composition by assuming that a 
property of the individual, a preference, is also a 
property of the group. For participants of this con-
ference, the bottom line should be underlined. The 
application of risk/benefit analysis, depending upon 
some technical aspects of the application, rests 
squarely on the concept of group preference as a 
foundational property. Even though the practitioners 
may not say so, the formal properties of the social 
preference concept which cause all the problems are 
lurking beneath the surface of risk/benefit proce-
dures. 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION MODELS 
Not only do we have a problem with this concept 
"social preference," but we are beginning to develop 
a rather striking conclusion about the nature of 
social decision processes in general. The choices of 
groups are very sensitive to the processes or proce-
dures they use. Very small changes in procedures can 
have radical consequences for the final decisions. In 
fact, if you are good at choosing your procedures and 
are well informed, you can get groups to do almost 
anything you want, even though they appear to be 
voting democratically. 
Let us take two more examples. Suppose the pref-
erences are as below. 
Mr. 1 Mr. 2 Mr. 3 Mr. 4 Mr. 5 Mr. 6 Mr. 7 
W W W X X X y 
X X X y y W W 
y y y W W y X 
If we apply the Borda count introduced above, 
then x is the winner with 16 points. However, if 
majority rule is used, w is a clear winner, since it 
beats both x and y. 
Here is another example. Let the preference be as 
given. 
Mr.l Mr.2 Mr. 3 Mr.4 Mr. 5 Mr.6 Mr. 7 
w w w X X y y 
X X X y y z z 
y y y w z w w 
z z z z w X X 
Vote Vote Vote 
For For For 
One Two Three 
w 3- 6 12 
X 2 7- 12 
y 2 6 13-
z 0 2 5 
First consider the process whereby the individuals 
simply vote for their first preference. The winner is 
w. However, had the group voted for top two, giving 
their top choice two points and their second choice 
one, the outcome would have been x. If the group 
had decided to use a process whereby each voted for 
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the top three (in Borda fashion), the choice would be 
y, 
So, the choice between the three processes (vote for 
your top one, vote for your top two, or vote for your 
top three) turns out to be a choice between w, x, and 
y. The group's choice in this example is completely 
determined by the process. 
There are again two punch lines. One is that when 
you start with a concept of preference which makes 
sense at the individual level and extend it to the group 
level, you have real problems, not all of which we 
understand. The second thing is that it appears as 
though the processes the group uses to make deci-
sions systematically influences the decisions they 
make. 
This second conclusion needs emphasis here. Other 
speakers have rested much of their philosophy of 
public decisions upon public hearings. It is very easy 
to say, "Let's get the citizens together and listen to 
them. We want only to do what they want." The 
thesis here is that the procedures used when listening 
to the public's pulse largely determine what you hear. 
The procedures are overwhelmingly important. Some 
behavioral data will help elaborate the nature of this 
hypothesis. 
Again, when reviewing the evidence, I must plead 
guilty of playing the academic trick of using only 
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simple cases. I hope this audience will understand the 
difficulties of doing otherwise. 
The experiment involves a group of five people 
who must choose a point on the blackboard. That 
seems easy. There is an infinite number of points on 
the blackboard, but a coordinate system makes any 
one of them easy to locate. The group is to use 
majority rule, and in particular, must use Robert's 
rules. A motion (point) is placed on the floor. The 
motion on the floor can be amended freely (displaced 
to another point). The process continues until some-
one calls the question and the motion on the floor is 
adopted. 
Ordinarily, this task would seem silly and useless, 
but here the individuals are given financial incen-
tives. Those incentives are used to induce substantial 
conflict. 
Look at Figure 2. Each individual is assigned a 
point on the blackboard. For example, Individual 5 
has been told that if you can get the group to choose 
the point indicated as (38, 52) he will receive $28.00. 
He knows he will be paid in cash, so the incentives 
are real. The further the group's choice is away from 
his point, the less he will get. In fact, as you sweep 
through the point (39, 68), moving in a direction 
away from (30, 52), it costs Individual 5 about a 
dollar t~ a dollar fifty per unit on a 150 by 200 grid. 
vGt n I typkol iodi,idool iodifl"'"" '""' 
v 
G 
0 
Figure 2. Hypothetical behavioral case. 
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Each individual has a different optimum point. 
The optimals for Individuals 1, 2, 3, 4 and S are in-
dexed by the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. 
Each has a single optimum. An individual's payoff is 
reduced as the group choice is moved away from his 
optimum. The group can choose only one point. 
There can be no side payments nor bribes. Individu-
als can complain, argue, and curse, but no mention 
of monetary magnitudes can be made. The final 
point must be chosen by majority vote. 
140 
0 
What do you think the group would do? There are 
ma?y comp~ting theories which predict a great 
vanety of pomts. As it turns out, however, there is 
now really no controversy about what they will do. 
Under these circumstances, the group will choose the 
core of the cooperative game model. Some data are 
shown in Figure 3. Each dot is the decision of a 
different group of people. As you can see, they are 
well contained around the point (39, 68), which is the 
core. There are three points right on it. 
O,~Coreor • .0 • Meon Mojority rule equilibrium ( 39,68) (37.5,68.5) 
0 
• Observation 0 ® Two observations 
0 
Figure 3. Behavioral case results. 
Figure 4 demonstrates what happens if people have 
elliptical indifference curves. As can be seen, the data 
are again grouped close to the core (63, 59). Figure 5, 
where individuals have rhomboid indifference 
curves, again demonstrates the accuracy of the 
core/equilibrium model. 
Are we to conclude that groups using any set of 
procedures will naturally choose the majority rule 
core? No! We can conclude that groups using these 
procedures will choose the core, but alternative pro-
cedures lead to different outcomes. These data show 
only that groups behave in a systematic fashion and 
can, in special circumstances, be modeled mathe-
matically. If Robert's rules had been dropped, the 
outcome variance would increase. If unanimity re-
placed majority rule, the outcome distribution would 
have been shifted to the right. The effects of parlia-
mentary chances regarding amendment processes, 
such as the closed rule, are known to systematically 
change the outcomes. 
Perhaps the most interesting and dramatic way to 
demonstrate the point is with fixed agenda. First, it is 
necessary to see agendas from an abstract point of 
view. Certain types of agenda motions operate to se-
quentially eliminate options. Suppose, for example, 
the vote was on a banquet. Four different types of 
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Figure 4. Elliptical indifference curves. 
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(133.2,.69.3) 
(135,67) 
(138,66) 
banquets are available (two cuisines-Mexican and 
French, ~nd two attires- formal or informal). If the 
agenda f1rst called for a majority vote on attire and 
ITEM ONE 
Attire 
secondly for a majority vote on cuisine, the decision 
tree would be: 
ITEM TWO 
Cuisine 
Formal, Mexican 
Formal, French' 
Formal, Mexican 
Formal, Mexican 
Informal, Mexican 
Formal, French 
Informal, French 
Formal, French 
Informal, Mexican 
Informal, Mexican 
Informal, French 
Informal, French 
If the agenda called for a vote on -cuisine first and then attire, the tree would be: 
ITEM ONE 
Cuisine 
ITEM TWO 
Attire 
Formal, Mexican 
Formal, Mexican 
Informal, Mexican 
Formal, Mexican 
Informal, Mexican 
Formal, French 
Informal, French 
Informal, Mexican 
Formal, French 
Formal, French 
Informal, French 
Informal, French 
As can be seen, different agendas induce different 
trees. The interesting point is this: these different 
trees induce different group decisions. In fact, if 
there is ample conflict among group members, this 
single parameter can be used to induce the group to 
choose anything you wish. In other words, the 
agenda can be used to systematically influence, if not 
dictate, the group's decision, even though the group 
is voting and discussing issues openly and democrati-
cally. 
Not only is the agenda such an important parame-
ter, the agenda appears in very subtle ways. Consider 
Figure 6 where several different ways of wording mo-
tions are listed. Take the first example, where the 
choice is between three options, x, y, and z. If the 
question is: "Do we want x or do we not?", a "yes" 
answer yields x and a ''no'' answer yields a choice be-
tween y and z. However, if the question is: "Do we 
want x?", a "yes" answer yields x while a "no" 
answer returns us to consider all three, since the ques-
tion was not worded to discharge x as a possibility. 
The figure continues with other wordings and indi-
cates the trees they induce. Agenda theory suggests 
that under a wide set of circumstances, these trees 
determine the outcome. 3 
Individuals who control the group's decisionma~-
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QUESTION 
Do we want 
or do we not? 
Do we wont __ ? 
EXAMPLE OPTION 
IN THE "BLANK" 
X 
X 
Can we eliminate _? X 
Of the two, which 
shall we eliminate? 
Of the two, which 
do we · prefer ? 
y 
{x.v} 
(x.v} 
TREE DIAGRAM 
Figure 6. ·Some possible ways of applying a binary process to a three element choice situation. 
ing procedures are in a very powerful position. In 
fact, some researchers feel that group expressions re-
flect little more than the opinion of the vested interest 
which won the premeeting jockeying for control of 
the procedures. The most cynical opinions could be 
offset if there were a natural set of ''best'' pro-
cedures. If a "group preference" could be defined, 
one could design procedures which result in the 
choice of the "most preferred" outcome. Unfortu-
nately, these ideas are exactly those that the impossi-
bility theorems suggest will not work. 
CONCLUSION 
I am afraid I leave you, as I remain myself, on the 
horns of a dilemma regarding the systematic incor-
poration of public attitudes into administrative 
(bureaucratic) decisionmaking. From my value point 
of view, I would think it outrageous if individual 
attitudes were not consulted. Yet the measurement 
problems and aggregation problems implicit in 
risk/benefit analysis leave me skeptical of the ad-
vantages of complete adoption of these methods. 
Certainly, it would seem premature to bulld upon 
them legislation which called for anything other than 
calculating the numbers. On the. other hand, the al-
ternative routes-public hearings, polls, meetings 
with citizen groups, and voting have their own prob-
lems. The procedures are of overwhelming impor-
tance, and the Ames theories which tell us to be 
skeptical of formal risk/benefit calculations tell us 
that all procedures have similar complications. The 
bizarre properties we have seen in the examples above 
are characteristic. Perhaps at this point the best we 
can do is to warn decisionmakers about being over-
confident that they can simply, in any formal sense, 
"follow the preference of the people." 
REFERENCES 
1. Lichtenstein, S. and P. Slovic, "Response-In-
duced Reversals of Preference in Gambling: An 
Extended Replication in Las Vegas," Journal 
of Experimental Psychology 101, 16-20 (June, 
1973); and D.M. Grether and C.R. Plott, 
''Economic Theory of Choice and the Pre-
ference Reversal Phenomenon," American 
Economic Review (forthcoming, 1979). 
2. Arrow, K. J., Social Choice and Individual 
Values, Wiley, 1963; P.C. Fishburn, The 
Theory of Social Choice, Princeton University 
Press, 1973; C.R. Plott, "Axiomatic Social 
Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpreta-
tion,'' American Journal of Political Science 20 
(August, 1976); and A.K. Sen, Collective 
Choice and Social Welfare, Holden-Day, 1970. 
3. Levine, M. E. and C.R. Plott, "Agenda Theory 
and Its Implications," Virginia Law Review 63 
(May, 1977); and C.R. Plott and M.E. Levine, 
"A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee 
Decision," American Economic Review 68 
(March, 1978). 
47 
